Abstract-I look for divisions to clusters among academic departments in three disciplines: economics, mathematics, and comparative literature. I define clusters as subsets of departments with unexpectedly little hiring across the cluster lines. The division within economics is by far the strongest, is consistent with anecdotal evidence about "freshwater" and "saltwater" schools of thought and has been stable over time. There is also a significant division within comparative literature, but the hiring patterns among top mathematics departments are consistent with random matching.
I. Introduction
T HE recent debate over the appropriate policy response to the financial crisis of 2008 has brought to the surface old divisions among economists. Many disputes seem to be related to methodological differences among macroeconomists that go back to differing attitudes toward the contributions of Keynes. 1 Another divide, not entirely unrelated, is between the proponents of structural and reduced-form methods of research in the field of industrial organization. In both cases, most academic economists probably recognize that some departments are reputed as being in one camp or another. In this paper, I ask whether there exists a significant division of economics departments into clusters that prefer to hire from the same cluster (the answer is yes), whether this division has changed since the 1980s (no), and whether economics is special in having such a split (a qualified yes). 2 I use data on faculty composition by Ph.D. origin from three academic disciplines: economics, comparative literature, and mathematics. Within each discipline, I compare all possible partitions of top departments into two clusters of equal size and pick the division that minimizes hiring across clusters. I measure the significance of the division against its bootstrapped distribution under the null hypothesis of random matching between the actual sets of positions and professors.
I find that economics has a significant division that appears to be stable over time and is consistent with what are commonly thought of as the "freshwater" and "saltwater" schools of thought even up to the relative strengths of attachment to the clusters by individual departments. The likelihood that a hire from another top department is a hire from the other cluster is about three-quarters of what it would be in the absence of a division. By contrast, the apparent division in mathematics is not stronger than what would be likely to appear under random matching. In the end, I analyze the division within economics in more detail and discuss potential causes for the split.
II. Data
Lists of professors in all three disciplines were obtained from departmental home pages in 2004. The data sources for Ph.D. origin were department Web pages, personal CVs, the ProQuest dissertation database, and the Mathematics Genealogy Project (www.genealogy.ams.org). In addition, listings of economics professors in 1987 were obtained from an old graduate study guide (Owen & Ruby, 1989) . All tenured and tenure-track faculty (assistant, associate, and full professors) for each academic department in the sample were included, except those who were cross-listed from other departments and whose title only included other disciplines.
The full sample consists of the faculty at 120 Ph.D.-granting departments in economics in 2004 and 92 in 1987, 40 in mathematics, and 42 in comparative literature. For economics, the 2004 data include all 107 U.S. departments with Ph.D. programs as listed in the National Research Council's study (1995) and a further 13 universities that each had at least 5 placements in the initial sample. The 1987 data include all U.S. departments with a Ph.D. program that are listed in the guide. For comparative literature, the sample includes all departments listed in the NRC study. For mathematics, the sample was defined as follows: the 10 most effective Ph.D. programs as ranked by the NRC study were used as the seed; further U.S. programs were added step by step if they had at least 5 placements within the existing sample; this method converged at 40 departments. 3 The main analysis is based on analyzing the hiring patterns at 16 top U.S.-based departments, where the subset of "top departments" is defined according to a measure of influence computed from the hiring and placement matrix of the full sample. This influence measure was introduced by Pinski and Narin (1976) to rank academic journals using citation data; here, the hiring of a Ph.D. graduate from another department is analogous to a journal citing another journal. The method is described in more detail in the appendix. This measure is notable for being, with a small modification, behind the PageRank algorithm used by Google to rank Web pages. 4 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
It was first used in economics by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) to rank economics journals and recently by Amir and Knauff (2008) to rank the top fifty economics departments in the world.
III. Visual Cluster Analysis
Finding clusters, or "cliques," is a common task in social network analysis. Theoretically clusters are subsets of nodes (here, departments) in a network that are more connected (here, by hiring each others' graduates) to each other than to the rest of the network. I first apply two standard exploratory methods of looking for clusters: multidimensional scaling (MDS) and agglomerative hierarchical clustering.
MDS is a method for projecting data points into a reduced number of dimensions (typically two), so that the distances between the points represent the relative dissimilarity of the corresponding data points. 5 The results of MDS are mapped in figure 1, where interactions (defined as hires plus placements) with other departments were used to define the data point for each department. To keep the plots readable, only the top twenty departments are included in each discipline. (The rankings by influence are used in defining the top throughout.) After removing the U.K.-based departments as outliers, the "eyeball test" suggests a division in economics that fits the anecdotal evidence about departments from Chicago to Rochester forming a "freshwater" school of thought, where research methodology (and possibly ideology) is on average different from that prevalent at the "saltwater" departments from Harvard to Berkeley. The horizontal dimensions appears to capture the "degree of salinity," but it is hard to see any particular interpretation for the vertical dimension.
The pattern of the MDS map in comparative literature is mostly consistent with perceived notions of departments that are closer to Yale as being more theoretical as opposed to traditional in their approach. 6 Mathematics does not suggest an easily interpretable pattern. Figure 2 shows dendrograms that illustrate the results of hierarchical agglomerative clustering. 7 There, each department is initially defined as its own cluster at the bottom of the hierarchy. Moving upward in the tree, the two most similar clusters are always the next to be merged into a new cluster by a horizontal connecting line. The heights of the vertical lines capture the magnitude of the dissimilarity among the clusters. The same patterns that are visible in the MDS figures also show up in the dendrograms. Overall, a casual comparison of the dendrograms across disciplines suggests that in economics, there is a clearer division into two dissimilar clusters that encompass almost all departments (the exception is CalTech, which also appeared as a relative outlier among U.S. departments in figure 1) . In mathematics and, to some 5 See Appendix B for more on the methodology of MDS, and Eagly (1975) , who used it to find clusters in the citation network of economics journals.
6 Timothy Hampton, private communication. 7 See section C in the appendix for more on this methodology. extent, in literature, there are also clear differences between the clusters suggested by figures 1 and 2. Are the visually suggested clusters real or just an artifact of human pattern recognition? To find out, I next use a nonparametric method to find clusters and then test them against the null hypothesis of random matching.
IV. Nonparametric Cluster Analysis
Suppose we started from a prior definition of two clusters, that is, from a given partition of departments into two bins. The null hypothesis is that every position and professor had an equal chance of being matched. How likely is it that we would observe this proportion of cross-cluster movements under the null hypothesis? A simple chi square test of independence could be used to check whether the hiring patterns in fact exhibit significant clustering. However, when the partition has been chosen precisely to make the division appear strong, then the naive chi square test is biased toward finding clustering. After all, even under random matching, it would be possible to find some partitions with relatively few cross-cluster hires. A better question is, Is there a division that is deeper than we could expect to find due to random factors?
To obtain the correct distribution for the chi square statistic under the null hypothesis of no clustering, I created rematchings, where in each rematching, the actual populations of professors and positions were randomly matched. For each rematching, all possible partitions into two clusters of equal size were considered, and the chi square statistic for the strongest possible partition was recorded. The resulting distribution of chi square statistics was then used to evaluate the significance of the strongest possible partition found in the sample.
The number of possible partitions explodes when adding more departments, so to keep the bootstrap calculations manageable, the data are restricted to the sixteen most influential departments in the United States. Also, because self-hires are inevitably also within-cluster hires, the apparent preference for self-hiring would be confounded with clustering. Therefore, self-hires are excluded from cluster analysis-both from the data and as a possibility in the rematchings. (The proportion of home-grown faculty is 6.7%, 7.1%, and 9.9% in economics, math, and literature, respectively; the expected proportions under random matching are 1.2%, 2.5%, and 2.6%.)
The results of the cluster analysis are reported in table 1. Dividing the top sixteen departments into two clusters of eight departments so as to minimize the proportion of crosscluster hires leads to 33.9% of all hires in economics to be cross-cluster in 2004 and 37.5% in 1987; in mathematics, this fraction is 41.8% and in literature 38.7%. The division within economics is so deep that none of the 10,000 rematchings produced a division as strong as the sample value in either year. Thus it can (conservatively) be concluded that the bootstrap p-value for the test against no division within economics is below 0.0001. It is also striking that the strongest partition in economics is exactly the same in both 1987 and 2004. 8 By comparison, in mathematics the observed division 8 The definition of the top sixteen departments is based on the 2004 ranking. Hiring data for Harvard and CalTech in 1987 are missing, and Pinski-Narin influence is not defined for departments with missing hiring data. (In terms of section A in the appendix, matrix T would become is marginally statistically significant when taking as given the best partition, with a naive p-value of 0.068. In the random matching exercise, such partitions or stronger resulted in more than 27.8% of the rematchings, so I conclude there reducible). However, they can still be included in the cluster analysis as their placements are observed in the hiring data of the other departments.
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Figure 2.-Dendrograms of the Hiring Data
Results from the hierarchical cluster analysis of the hiring and placement patterns for the top sixteen U.S. departments. See the appendix for details.
is no evidence for a division within mathematics. In comparative literature, the clustering is statistically significant but not as strong as in economics: the sample value of the chi square test statistic or higher resulted in about 6.2% of the rematchings.
The statistically strong division within economics does not by any means imply near isolation between the clusters. A little over a third of professors trained by one and hired by another top sixteen department moved across the divide. By comparison, under random matching, this proportion is on average 44%, so the likelihood that any hire from another department is a hire from the other cluster is about three-fourths of what it would be in the absence of a division. Unfortunately I do not have data on the fields of specialization, as the division could be much stronger among macroeconomists than in other fields.
V. Close-Up on the Division within Economics
A strict division to discrete clusters is only an abstraction, and in practice, some departments are going to be more strongly part of some cluster while others are more neutral. This is also why having the clusters be equal sized is not a crucial assumption; the point of the clusters is to help uncover a particular dimension of heterogeneity. Table 2 shows the strength of the attachment to the clusters in economics in 2004, defined as the proportion of interactions (hires plus placements) that a department has with cluster 1 (the saltwater cluster) out of its interactions with all other departments in the U.S. top sixteen. For brevity, I call this measure the "salt content." Columbia and Berkeley are the saltiest departments, at 89.5% and 85.5%, respectively. (In terms of hiring only, these departments are even more extreme, with 39 of 40 hires at Berkeley coming from other saltwater departments.) At the other end of the spectrum are Rochester and Minnesota, with 34.6% and 35% salt content, respectively. These proportions must be compared to the average salt content of 65.7% within the top sixteen. Yale, Stanford, and Chicago are so close to the average that they appear neutral in terms of relative connectedness with the two clusters.
With one exception, the decomposition of interactions in table 2 reveals that the partition holds up separately for hires and placements: either way, the saltiest departments are found in the saltwater cluster. Chicago is an exceptional case because in its hiring, it is closer to the other cluster; its appearance in the freshwater cluster is entirely due to the high proportion of its placements that have ended up at more hard-core freshwater departments. However, Chicago's relatively high proportion of hires from the saltwater cluster (77.4%, compared with the average proportion of 71.9%) is due to the exceptionally strong influence of Chicago within the freshwater cluster: since self-hires are excluded from the data, most of the freshwater-trained faculty at Chicago are excluded from this analysis.
The impact of including self-hires can be seen in figure 3 , where influence is plotted against salt content. When only junior faculty are included, Chicago appears in line within the rest of freshwater cluster, perhaps because many future self-hires are still doing their junior stints at other freshwater departments. The salt content for departments outside the U.S. top sixteen is defined the same way, as the proportion of interactions with saltwater departments as a fraction of all interactions with the top 16. Table 3 lists the salt content for all 91 departments that have strictly positive influence in 2004. Table 3 also lists bootstrapped confidence intervals for the ranking by influence. It shows that below the top ten, rankings are quite approximate; for example, only 12 schools can "confidently" be placed in the top 20 and only 25 in the top 40. The reason that influence does not closely reflect the relative number of placements is that a small number of placements at top departments (such as by CalTech and Penn State) convey more influence than a large number of placements at lower-ranked departments.
The level of relative connectedness to the academic clusters can be measured for any institutions that employ Ph.D.s in a discipline that exhibits clustering. As an example of independent interest, table 4 shows the salt content at the banks of the Federal Reserve, defined as the average salt content of the alma mater of their research economists. 9 The thirteen Feds (twelve district banks and the Board of Governors) are also divided along a saltwater-freshwater dimension, by more than what could be expected if the existing set of Fed economists was matched randomly with the existing numbers of positions. The level of between-Fed variance in salt content found in 10,000 random rematchings was never as high as the actual sample value. As for the individual Feds, the highest salt content is found in Boston (which could be attributed to geographical proximity to prominent saltwater departments), while Richmond is the least salty (which can hardly be attributed to geography).
VI. Discussion
Could mere geography explain clustering in academic labor markets? It is plausible that the costs of hiring (informational or otherwise) are increasing in geographic distance. This should result in a tendency for some aggregate measure of distance of faculty movements to be minimized, which would show up as geographic clustering. Surely this is the natural explanation for why the U.K.-based economics departments form an outlying group in the visual cluster analysis. However, in none of the disciplines is the strongest possible division (shown in table 1) based on an obvious split on a large geographical scale. Furthermore, the lack of a significant division within mathematics seems to rule out distance as a sufficient explanation for clustering.
However, geography as the cause behind clustering cannot be dismissed quite so easily, because distance could have a nonlinear impact, and the sets of top departments are not exactly the same in each discipline. Perhaps there is an advantage of being in the same metro area, but not much beyond that. Notably, all four within-metro-area pairs of departments in economics are in the same cluster (Harvard/MIT and Berkeley/Stanford in the saltwater, and Chicago/Northwestern and CalTech/UCLA in the freshwater cluster). However, this too fails to explain why mathematics is not significantly divided, because there are also four within-metro-area pairs in mathematics, but three of them are split across the apparent clusters (Columbia/NYU, CalTech/UCLA and Berkeley/Stanford; the exception is Harvard/MIT). I conclude by proposing two possible (by no means mutually exclusive) driving forces for the strong clustering in economics that can at the same time be consistent with the lack of significant clustering in mathematics. The first is informational costs. It may be harder to objectively assess a job candidate's quality in economics than in mathematics, so personal contacts are more important in selecting interviewees and evaluating job candidates; after all, mathematics is the ultimate objective discipline. Even if there were initially only random patterns in hiring propensities, the informational advantage from personal connections would then work to strengthen existing connections, because departments that are more connected by past movements of faculty are better informed of each others' job candidates and of the level of bias in their letters of recommendation. 10 There is not necessarily anything insidious about such cluster bias in hiring, as it could be an optimal response to the information structure in this labor market. 11 
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-Influence and Division within Economics
The horizontal axis represents the proportion of U.S. top sixteen placements and hires to or from the saltwater cluster; see table 2. The vertical axis represents influence in the hiring network, in the sense of Pinski and Narin (1976) . The connected dots show the results when self-hires are not excluded from the data. Rank: ordering by influence, as defined by Pinski and Narin (1976) , but with self-hires excluded. A further 29 sample departments are unranked at exact zero influence, because they have no placements at any department with influence. Salt: proportion of interactions with saltwater cluster out of all interactions with U.S. top sixteen (see table 2 Bootstrapped p-value against the null that between-Fed variation in salt content is due to random matching. The highest between-group standard deviation in 10,000 random matchings was 0.068.
The second possible explanation for clustering is horizontal differentiation caused by a complementarity in methodology or "research style" within departments. Consider first the fact that hiring patterns are very hierarchical in that higherranked departments place their graduates both laterally and at lower-ranked universities, while movements upward are more rare: of all the faculty at the top ten economics departments, 79.6% received their Ph.D. inside the top ten. For mathematics, this figure is 58.3% and for comparative literature 63.2%. 12 Such hierarchy can easily be explained by complementarities in research quality (for example, due to peer externalities), as these tend to generate sorting by quality ("positive assortative matching") among both faculty and students. This can be described as vertical differentiation. If, in addition, there is a horizontal dimension to the differentiation among individuals and complementarities along this dimension, then it would be efficient to also sort faculty to departments by horizontal qualities. According to this explanation, mathematics does not have a dimension of horizontal differentiation, at least in the sense that would be subject to complementarities between faculty members.
Colander (2005) surveyed economics Ph.D. students at seven top programs and presents some evidence for horizontal differentiation among departments. He found that students at Chicago (the only freshwater department in the sample) held significantly different policy opinions compared to students at other schools. For example, they had the least confidence in the stabilizing potential of fiscal policy and the most concern that minimum wages increase unemployment. In terms of rating the importance of economic assumptions, Chicago students were again different (having the highest percentage of students who checked "the neoclassical assumption of rational behavior" and "the rational expectations hypothesis" as very important and "price rigidities" as unimportant), but the magnitudes of these differences were not large. Ideology is a special case of horizontal differentiation (and somewhat uncomfortable for the self-image of economists), and it seems clear that ideology can hardly be a factor in mathematics. However, in Colander's data, the students in Chicago were not unusual by their distribution of political orientation.
